The influence of relatives on the efficiency and error rate of familial searching. by Rohlfs, Rori et al.
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
The influence of relatives on the efficiency and error rate of familial searching.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/31q6r374
Journal
PLoS One, 8(8)
Authors
Rohlfs, Rori
Murphy, Erin
Song, Yun
et al.
Publication Date
2013
DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0070495
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
The Influence of Relatives on the Efficiency and Error
Rate of Familial Searching
Rori V. Rohlfs1*, Erin Murphy2, Yun S. Song3,4, Montgomery Slatkin1
1Department of Integrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley, California, United States of America, 2 School of Law, New York University, New York, New York,
United States of America, 3Computer Science Division, University of California, Berkeley, California, United States of America, 4Department of Statistics, University of
California, Berkeley, California, United States of America
Abstract
We investigate the consequences of adopting the criteria used by the state of California, as described by Myers et al. (2011),
for conducting familial searches. We carried out a simulation study of randomly generated profiles of related and unrelated
individuals with 13-locus CODIS genotypes and YFilerH Y-chromosome haplotypes, on which the Myers protocol for relative
identification was carried out. For Y-chromosome sharing first degree relatives, the Myers protocol has a high probability
(80*99%) of identifying their relationship. For unrelated individuals, there is a low probability that an unrelated person in
the database will be identified as a first-degree relative. For more distant Y-haplotype sharing relatives (half-siblings, first
cousins, half-first cousins or second cousins) there is a substantial probability that the more distant relative will be
incorrectly identified as a first-degree relative. For example, there is a 3*18% probability that a first cousin will be identified
as a full sibling, with the probability depending on the population background. Although the California familial search
policy is likely to identify a first degree relative if his profile is in the database, and it poses little risk of falsely identifying an
unrelated individual in a database as a first-degree relative, there is a substantial risk of falsely identifying a more distant Y-
haplotype sharing relative in the database as a first-degree relative, with the consequence that their immediate family may
become the target for further investigation. This risk falls disproportionately on those ethnic groups that are currently
overrepresented in state and federal databases.
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Introduction
DNA databases have unquestionably assumed a vital role in the
American criminal justice system. Genetic evidence has served to
bolster the evidence in existing cases and to identify suspects
through ‘‘cold hit’’ database matches [1]. Typically, investigative
queries in DNA databases have been limited to searches intended
to find the source of the crime-scene sample. However, increasing
attention has been given to the question of whether law
enforcement should also be able to search for partial matches,
that is, DNA searches intended to find the source by identifying a
relative in the database [1,2]. Such searches are commonly called
‘‘kinship’’ or ‘‘familial’’ searches.
The concept of familial searching is not particularly new. In
fact, familial searches fueled some of the earliest illustrations of the
investigative power of DNA typing [3]. In 2002, investigators in
the United Kingdom identified a serial rapist in part through a
database search that led them to the perpetrator via the DNA
profile of his son [4]. In another widely cited case, UK
investigators recovered DNA from a brick thrown off an overpass
that landed on a truck, leading to the driver’s fatal heart attack,
and found the source through a database search that located a
relative [5]. More recently, California authorities used a familial
search to identify the putative son of a serial killer nicknamed the
‘‘Grim Sleeper,’’ and arrested the suspect after a sting operation in
which police collected a discarded pizza crust [5].
Familial searches by no means dominate the use patterns of
DNA databases, in part because they are difficult to conduct,
require access to a sizeable database, are subject to various clear or
unclear legal restrictions, and raise ethical concerns [6]. Because
familial searches are by design inexact, the most effective methods
typically employ several steps beyond a simple database search. To
find a lead, one commonly used approach, which may entail
additional rounds of testing, relies on examining the Y haplotype
of all significant partial matches. Even if a partial match is
identified, law enforcement still must investigate the relatives of
that person to determine if any are likely to be the crime scene
sample source.
Nevertheless, familial searches are presently conducted by a
number of jurisdictions and continue to garner interest. The UK
is the most prominent and longstanding advocate of the
technique: from 2004 to 2011, 179 cases were submitted for
search [7]. As of 2009, New Zealand had conducted 12 familial
searches in serious cases [8]. The Netherlands recently passed
legislation authorizing familial searches [9,10]. Japan, Australia
and Canada have robust DNA collection programs, but only
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Canada has explicitly rejected familial searches on what appear
to be privacy grounds [11].
With regard to Europe, it is worth noting that adoption may be
slowed by the December 2008 judgment by the European Court of
Human Rights that declared the retention of DNA profiles and
samples from unconvicted persons a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. That opinion, (S. & Marper v. United Kingdom),
invoked the provision of the Convention that safeguards its
members’ ‘‘private life’’ [12]. Although the influence of the ruling
beyond its immediate holding is unclear, the Marper decision does
represent the first substantial curtailment of DNA expansion
programs by a legal entity. Moreover, Marper may be used by
privacy advocates and opponents to widespread DNA typing to
bolster their legal claims to circumscribe such programs.
In the United States, the push to expand DNA testing has
intensified. Originally, United States national database adminis-
trators prohibited the disclosure of identifying information for
partial matches made across state lines [5]. As a result, although
many states either legally authorized or informally permitted
partial match (‘‘moderate stringency’’) reporting and/or familial
searches [13], investigators could not obtain informational leads
on profiles generated out of state. In 2006, however, the FBI
modified its policy and now permits interstate sharing [14]. As of
May 2012, a bill was pending before Congress that would allow
the FBI to conduct familial searches in federal and state
investigations [15].
Because the rules governing familial search methods in the
United States consist of a patchwork of state law, state and local
regulation, and even internal laboratory policies [5,6], it is
impossible to relate a precise legal picture. In June of 2013, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v. King [16] upheld DNA
collection from arrestees for serious offenses. Although the Court
noted that Maryland forbids familial searches, that observation did
not seem central to its holding, and no lower courts have ruled on
the issue. Assessment is further complicated by the slim line that
differentiates unintentional and intentional partial match searches,
because some jurisdictions allow the former but not the latter.
Nevertheless, some clarity is possible.
At the state level, both Maryland and Washington, D.C. have
laws expressly forbidding familial searching [17,18], although the
language of both statutes could be interpreted to permit reporting
of unintentional partial matches. As a matter of either written or
unwritten policy, roughly nine states expressly forbid both partial
matching and familial searching: Alaska, Nevada, Utah, New
Mexico, Michigan, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Georgia [19]. At
least another seven states prohibit familial searches, but allow
reporting of inadvertent partial matches [19]. Fifteen states allow
both forms of partial matching, although all of them rely upon
formal or informal policies rather than express statutory autho-
rization [19].
The states most actively pursuing familial matches are
California, Colorado, Virginia, and Texas; Pennsylvania, Minne-
sota, and Tennessee are considering legislation. In April 2008,
California became the first state to formally endorse and adopt
explicit rules for conducting intentional familial searches [20].
The burgeoning interest in familial searching has reignited a
national conversation about the propriety of the method that
focuses on legal and ethical issues [21,22]. The major concerns are
two-fold: first, is familial searching actually efficacious, and second,
does it adequately respect privacy and equality interests?
With regard to efficacy, the challenges of familial searching are
reflected in its reported success rates, albeit based on limited data.
The UK reports the greatest effectiveness with a 11*27% success
rate) [23]. California has conducted 29 searches, with 2 reported
successes (*7% success rate) [24].
With regard to the ethical issues, familial searches raise privacy,
equality, and democratic accountability concerns [1,2,5,6,25,26].
In the United States, the most common critique is that the method
is likely to have a discriminatory effect because DNA databases
contain the profiles of certain racial minorities in disproportion to
their presence in the population. To date there have been only a
handful of efforts to quantify the impact of familial searches, and
all have been undertaken without reference to a specific search
policy [1–3]. Only one study, by a multidisciplinary team of
researchers, attempted to calculate the general discriminatory
impact and concluded that roughly ‘‘four times as much of the
African-American population as the U.S. Caucasian population
would be ‘under surveillance’ as a result of family forensic DNA’’
[2]. It is this estimation that scholars, policymakers and the
popular press have latched upon as a means of quantifying the
racial impact of familial searching [21,27–29], and while helpful, it
is nonetheless an approximation reached before any specific policy
was in place to be examined.
Answering the efficacy and ethical concerns raised by familial
search methods in part requires addressing complex statistical
questions. The articulation of the first formal familial search policy
by California [30], an American state with the world’s fourth
largest DNA database (nearly 2 million profiles) and a large and
diverse general population [31], affords an opportunity to gain
valuable insight into the question of whether and under what
circumstances familial searching should be allowed. The racial and
ethnic diversity of the California database roughly mirrors the
racial and ethnic diversity of the United States national database
[32,33]. Moreover, as a bellwether of criminal justice policy,
California has already wielded influence both nationally and
internationally as other jurisdictions contemplate various ap-
proaches.
Methods
Here we implement the Myers et al. familial identification
procedure used for familial searching in California [30] to estimate
power and false positive rate in addition to estimating the rates of
misidentification of distant relatives as first-degree relatives. As
detailed more below, in the Myers et al. method, both parent-
offspring and sibling relationships are considered by first
calculating each likelihood ratio using autosomal data between
the unknown sample and each entry in the state database. Of
these, the database samples with the highest likelihood ratios are
considered in a secondary likelihood ratio analysis using Y-
chromosome haplotypes. The cumulative likelihood ratios are
calculated under three population genetic assumptions and if they
pass particular thresholds, the individual is considered a suspect.
This method is detailed in our descriptions below.
All the analyses described were coded in c and R in scripts that
are available at github.com/rrohlfs/familial_searching.
Allele frequency data
Autosomal data. In this study, we use allele frequency
estimates to investigate identification procedures that are contin-
gent on racially defined population sample allele frequency
calculations. For the autosomal STR allele frequencies, we rely
upon estimates from a published survey of five population samples
consisting of 182–213 individuals each and classified according to
socially-identified race [33]. The groups are described in the study
as ‘Vietnamese,’ ‘African American,’ ‘Caucasian,’ ‘Hispanic,’ and
‘Navajo.’ Any labeling scheme introduces questions and classifies
Distant Relatives in Familial Searching
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groups in different ways not independent of the social construction
of these groups. In this study we use the labels Vietnamese
American, African American, European American, Latino Amer-
ican, and Native American.
The consent and population grouping procedures used to obtain
these data are not clear. Since these data were collected, the
customary ethical standards regarding informed consent processes
have changed considerably, driven by several cases of severe
misuse of samples provided by Indigenous communities [34–42].
We use these data because of their public availability and utility to
investigate error rates and efficacy in familial searching. We look
forward to working with data collected using transparent informed
consent methodology.
The California state database consists of some entries with the
13 core CODIS loci and some with 15 loci [30]. To maintain
manageable complexity, in this study we only consider the core 13
loci. Similar analyses can be performed with 15 locus profiles.
Y-chromosome data. For the Y-haplotypes, we consider
data released by ABI consisting of YFilerH haplotypes genotyped
in individuals grouped according to social labels ‘Vietnamese,’
‘African American,’ ‘Caucasian,’ ‘Hispanic,’ and ‘Native Ameri-
can’, with sample sizes of 103, 1918, 4102, 1594, and 105
individuals, respectively (Applied BiosystemsH, Foster City, CA)
[43]. Again, we refer to these groups as Vietnamese American,
African American, European American, Latino American, and
Native American.
Individuals were genotyped and categorized into population
labeling schemes differently for the autosomal and Y-chromosome
markers. In this study, we use samples with the same labels in both
the autosomal and Y chromosome data to get our combined
population sample allele frequencies for the Vietnamese Ameri-
can, African American, European American, and Latino Amer-
ican groups. Accordingly, the group we call Native American is
created from ‘Navajo’ autosomal marker allele frequencies and
‘Native American’ Y-chromosome allele frequencies. This incon-
sistency brings to question the relevance of these results for highly
specified populations. However, this degree of inconsistency in
population labeling is not remarkable when considering the wide
variation typical to categorizing population groups (social identity-
based labels like ‘Hispanic’, ‘African American,’ or ‘Caucasian’).
The results of the analysis of these data should be confirmed and
augmented by similar analyses of more transparent data.
Simulation scheme
Simulating relatives. To investigate the power and false
positive rate of relative identification procedures, pairs of related
individuals were simulated. Specifically, 100,000 pairs of parent-
offsprings, siblings, half-siblings, cousins, half-cousins (individuals
sharing a single grandparent), and second cousins (individuals
sharing a set of great-grand parents) were simulated using allele
frequency distributions for each of the five populations described
above. The relative pairs were simulated to share a Y-haplotype by
descent, and we refer to this sort of relationship as Y-sharing. The
autosomal markers for all of the individual pairs were simulated
with a population background relatedness parameter h~:01, in
accordance with the lower recommended correction in identifica-
tion likelihood ratio estimations [44].
Simulating unrelated individuals. Since unrelated individ-
uals very rarely share enough alleles to resemble genetic relatives,
more simulations are needed to accurately estimate the rates of
positive relative identification between unrelated individuals. To
this end, 200,000,000 pairs of unrelated individuals were simulated
based on allele frequencies from each pair of population samples.
Because of the immense polymorphism of Y-chromosome
haplotypes, accurate estimates of background Y-chromosome
relatedness (h^Y ) require greater sample sizes. To simulate Y-
haplotypes of unrelated individuals with realistic levels of
background relatedness, haplotypes were independently drawn
from the data. This way, rates of coincidentally shared Y-
haplotypes correspond with those observed in the available data.
Note that simulated rates of coincidentally shared Y-chromosome
haplotypes are greatly influenced by the available data, which for
some population samples is based on small numbers of individuals.
Relative identification procedure
Parent-offspring and sibling identification protocols were
followed with the method implemented in California which
incorporates autosomal and Y-chromosome haplotype data [30].
These calculations were performed on pairs of individuals
simulated with different genetic relationships, using the allele
frequencies from each population sample.
Autosomal likelihood ratio. Using autosomal data, the
standard likelihood ratio (LR) comparing the probabilities of the
observed genotypes (G) assuming a particular genetic relationship
(parent-offspring or sibling) and assuming the individuals are
unrelated is defined as [1,45]
cLRA~ P(GDk0,k1,k2)
P(GDk0~1,k1~0,k2~0)
, ð1Þ
where k0, k1, and k2 are parameters describing the probabilities
that individuals with the specified relationship share 0, 1, or 2
alleles identical by descent (IBD) [46]. As specified by Myers et al.,
this LR is estimated under three conditions using allele frequency
distributions from African American, European American, and
Latino American population samples with no h-correction for
population substructure, as practiced in California [30].
Y-haplotype likelihood ratio. Ignoring mutation, the prob-
ability that two Y-sharing relatives have the same haplotype of
population frequency p is p. On the other hand, the probability
that two unrelated male individuals each have that same haplotype
is p2. So, the Y-haplotype likelihood ratio LRY is 1=p. In the
Myers et al. procedure [30], LRY was estimated as the inverse of
the upper 95% confidence limit of the haplotype frequency,
obtained using the data pooled across populations excluding the
sampled haplotype [30,47]. Specifically, after exclusion, if the Y-
haplotype is observed with sample frequency p^ in the database,
cLRY~ p^z1:96 ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffip^(1{p^)
n
r" #{1
, ð2Þ
whereas if the Y-haplotype is not observed in the database,
cLRY~ 1{0:051=n {1, ð3Þ
where n denotes the total number of Y-haplotypes in the database.
Combined result. The combined test statistic defined by
Myers et al. [30] is the product of the autosomal marker and Y-
haplotype LR estimates, divided by the database size (N):
X~
cLRA:cLRY
N
: ð4Þ
X is calculated for each of the three population samples described
Distant Relatives in Familial Searching
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above. In this study we consider a database of size N~1,824,085,
the size of the California state database as of January 2012 [48].
An investigative positive identification (called simply a positive
identification here) is called when X is greater than 0.1 under all
three assumed population samples, and greater than 1.0 for at least
one population sample [30].
Results
False positive rates of relative identification
Unrelated individuals were simulated based on allele frequency
data from five population samples to investigate false positive rates
of parent-offspring and sibling identification. Autosomal and Y-
chromosome LRs were estimated using (1)–(3), and the combined
test statistic X defined in (4) was calculated for unrelated pairs of
individuals simulated from all pairs of population samples. Using
the procedure described by Myers et al. [30], false positive rates
were estimated for parent-offspring (Table 1) and sibling (Table 2)
identifications.
Even though false positive rates are low, on the order of
1|10{5 to 1|10{9, across population sample pairs, there is
some variation (Tables 1 and 2). In particular, the false positive
rates for unrelated pairs of individuals simulated with Vietnamese
American and with Native American allele frequencies are
relatively high and low, respectively (Tables 1 and 2). In sibling
identification, the Vietnamese American sample shows a compar-
atively high false positive rate of 1:1|10{5, while no false
positives are observed in the Native American sample (Table 2).
This can be explained by the particular Y-haplotype patterns
considered for these population samples. False positive identifica-
tions were observed only when unrelated individuals coincidentally
share a Y-haplotype. In the available Vietnamese American
population sample of Y-haplotypes (n~103), several pairs of
individuals share Y-haplotypes, while in the Native American
population sample (n~105), no individuals share Y-haplotypes. In
the other population samples, Y-haplotypes are shared at
frequencies intermediate to those in the Vietnamese American
and Native American population samples. Given the small sizes
for these population samples, it is not clear if varying rates of
coincidental Y-haplotype sharing are due to population genetic
differences, or stochasticity of small samples.
To examine the validity of the total lack of observed false
positive relative identifications for unrelated individuals simulated
from the Native American population sample, we consider the
possibility of observing complete Y-haplotype diversity (as
observed) by chance. Using simulations, 100,000 subsamples of
105 (the Native American sample size) Y-haplotypes were
randomly chosen from the larger African American, European
American, and Latino American samples. Of the subsamples,
0.67, 0.57, 0.37 of the African American, European American,
and Latino American samples, respectively, consisted of all unique
haplotypes, as observed in the Native American sample. This
indicates the plausibility that a small sample from a group with the
intermediate degree of Y-haplotype diversity observed in these
larger population samples could all have unique Y-haplotypes by
chance. Larger Y-haplotype samples are required to confidently
estimate false positive rates between unrelated individuals across
population samples.
False positives in the database context. Our results agree
with previous work, showing that with the prescribed methodol-
ogy, false positive rates of parent-offspring and sibling identifica-
tion are low, on the order of 1|10{5 to 1|10{9 (Tables 1 and 2)
[30]. But even with these low false positive rates, differences were
observed between population samples, raising the question of how
these differences in false positive rates interact with distortions in
DNA database representation.
To investigate this question, California census and prison
population proportions of Asian, African American, European
American, Latino American, and Native American individuals
were normalized to fit the assumption that all individuals are
described by exactly one of these categories (Table S1 in File S1)
[49,50]. In combining census and population genetic data, groups
labeled as ‘Vietnamese’ and ‘Asian’ were equated to each other.
Clearly, these simplifications limit the applicability of the
population sample-specificity of this analysis, however it provides
a first approach.
Using each of the census and prison demographics, the
proportion of false positive parent-offspring and sibling identifica-
tions that involve at least one member of each population group
were estimated (Tables S2 and S3 in File S1). As expected, in the
demographic context of a prison system in which African
Americans are drastically over-represented (Table S1 in File S1,
exact binomial test pv2:2|10{16), the rates of false identification
of individuals in this groups is much higher, roughly two orders of
magnitude higher (Tables S2 and S3 in File S1). Nevertheless, the
overall rate of false identification of unrelated individuals remains
low.
Spurious identification of distant relatives
The simulations of unrelated individuals showed low false
positive rates of parent-offspring and sibling identification.
However, distant Y-sharing relatives may be more often mistaken
for parent-offsprings or siblings. To investigate this, individuals
with various Y-sharing relationships (parent-offspring, siblings,
half-siblings, cousins, half-cousins, and second cousins) from
population sample backgrounds were simulated and used in the
Table 1. False positive parent-offspring identification rates between pairs of unrelated individuals simulated from all pairs of
population samples.
Vietnamese African European Latino Native
American American American American American
Vietnamese American 8.261027 5.061029 1.561028 ,5.061029 ,5.061029
African American 6.561028 ,5.061029 ,5.061029 ,5.061029
European American 1.561027 1.561028 1.061028
Latino American 1.361027 5.061029
Native American ,5.061029
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070495.t001
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same relative identification procedure. Note that when considering
Y-sharing relatives, the cLRY calculation is greatly influenced by
the database size, as opposed to the Y-haplotype reference
frequency.
The observed distributions of the test statistic X for second-
degree and distant relatives is shifted left of those for first-degree
relatives, but still has significant mass greater than 1 (Figure 1). So
as relatedness decreases, the X more effectively distinguishes first-
degree from distant Y-sharing relatives. Concordant with a
previous study [51], distinguishability is also higher with appro-
priately-specified allele frequencies in population samples with
higher polymorphism at the markers considered. By considering
these distributions, it is clear that regardless of the exact decision
procedure, distant Y-sharing relatives show elevated X values.
Positive rates vary across true relationships, population samples,
and tests of parent-offspring versus sibling relationships (Figure 2,
Tables 3 and 4). The power of the parent-offspring test varies from
0.94 to 0.99 and the sibling test varies from 0.68 to 0.85 for various
population samples. Of course, a different threshold procedure
could raise the power of these tests, but will simultaneously raise
the false positive rates. Regardless of the particular threshold
procedure, the relative trends observed across true relationships,
Table 2. False positive sibling identification rates between pairs of unrelated individuals simulated from all pairs of population
samples.
Vietnamese African European Latino Native
American American American American American
Vietnamese American 1.161025 ,5.061029 1.061028 5.061029 ,5.061029
African American 1.761027 ,5.061029 5.061029 1.061028
European American 1.761027 1.561028 4.061028
Latino American 4.361027 2.061028
Native American ,5.061029
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070495.t002
Figure 1. Distributions of the test statistic X , defined in (4), for sibling test for individuals who are siblings (solid red), parent-
offsprings (solid black), half-sibs (dashed black), cousins (dashdot black), and second cousins (dotted black). The population sample
individuals are sampled from is along the top and the assumed pop sample is along the side.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070495.g001
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population samples, and tests of parent-offspring versus sibling
relationships will hold for LR-based methods.
When implementing the full Myers et al. procedure to call
putative relatives, Y-sharing relatives are frequently mistakenly
identified as parent-offsprings or siblings (Table 4). Second degree
Y-sharing relatives like half-siblings are called as siblings in
5*24% of simulations (Table 4). The frequency of relative
identification decreases with the degree of relatedness (or
equivalently, those with higher kinship coefficients), but even Y-
sharing half-cousins are called as siblings in 1*10% of simula-
tions, depending on the population sample (Table 4).
Positive identification between distant Y-sharing relatives occurs
more often when considering sibling relationships rather than
parent-offspring because of the less stringent allele sharing
requirements. For example, Y-sharing half-siblings are called as
siblings in 5*24% of simulations and called as parent-offspring in
4*10% of simulations (Tables 3 and 4). Sharing at least one allele
at each locus, as required for parent-offspring relationships, is less
likely by chance than sharing on average one allele at each locus,
as expected for sibling relationships.
Higher rates of positive identification are observed for
individuals simulated with Native American or Vietnamese
American allele frequencies (Figure 2, Tables 3 and 4). This is
likely due to allele frequency misspecification inherent in the
method, which calculates the test statistic X under African
American, European American, and Latino American allele
frequencies only, and due to varying population sample gene
diversity, as found in a study of autosomal loci [51]. For
relatives simulated from African American, European Ameri-
can, or Latino American population samples, the method
correctly specifies their allele frequencies, so they show
comparatively lower identification rates (Figures 2 and 1,
Tables 3 and 4).
To show that these differences in identification rates across
population samples are not driven by differing sample sizes, the
same rates were estimated with a reduced Y-haplotype reference
of 103 haplotypes per population sample. Again, we see the
same trends across population samples, confirming that they are
not caused by varying reference Y-haplotype sample sizes
(Tables S4 and S5 in File S1). Note that the absolute false
identification rates differ in the full and subsample analysis
because the estimated Y-haplotype frequency a function of the
pooled sample size.
Discussion
We have investigated by computer simulation the consequences
of using a familial search policy similar to that described by Myers
et al. [30], which is the policy currently used by the state of
California for conducting familial searches. Our simulations
assumed that allele frequencies at the 13 CODIS loci and the Y
haplotypes for five ethnic groups are as given in Budowle et al. and
the ABI reference database [33,43]. We reach three main
conclusions. First, if the profile of a first-degree relative of a
randomly generated profile is in the database searched, there is a
relatively high probability of identifying the relative as such. Thus
we agree with Myers et al. [30], Bieber et al. [1], and Curran and
Buckleton [3] that familial searching can be an effective way to
identify first-degree Y-sharing relatives of an individual who left a
crime scene sample. However, note that the simulation study of
Bieber et al. [1] suggests higher identification efficiency than
observed in an empirical study by Curran and Buckleton [3],
possibly due to population structure in the empirical dataset [51].
Slooten and Meester [52] have also shown that there may be high
variability in power to identify relatives when considering profiles
of varying rareness in specific databases.
Second, we found that the probability of identifying an
unrelated Y-chromosome-carrying individual as a first-degree
relative is quite low, agreeing with the results of Myers et al. [30].
However, our ability to obtain precise estimates of this probability
for different ethnic groups is limited by the relatively small samples
sizes available to estimate Y haplotype frequencies, especially for
the Vietnamese American and Native American samples. For
population samples other than those, the probabilities are so low
that we could reasonably expect at most one unrelated individual
would be incorrectly identified as a first-degree relative even in a
database as large as California’s, which is approaching 2 million
profiles. The high false positive rate in the Vietnamese American
population sample is subject to sampling error with the relatively
low number of Y-haplotypes for this group (103 haplotypes), so we
hesitate to put great confidence behind that particular rate.
Our third conclusion is that there is a previously unrecognized
risk from conducting familial searches created by the possibility
that a more distant relative whose profile is in a database will be
incorrectly identified as a first-degree relative of the person who
left the crime-scene sample. With the data considered here (13
autosomal loci and 17-locus Y-haplotypes), even with other
Figure 2. Positive identification rates across different true relationships of individuals simulated from different sample populations
Vietnamese American (red circles), African American (orange triangles), European American (purple pluses), Latino American (blue
exes), and Native American (green diamonds); left plot is for sibling test, right for parent test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070495.g002
Table 3. Parent-offspring test identification rates for different Y-sharing relatives and population samples.
Vietnamese African European Latino Native
American American American American American
parent-offspring 0.997458 0.989336 0.987365 0.988130 0.998809
sibling 0.263659 0.244048 0.255853 0.248439 0.348373
half-sib 0.056135 0.045746 0.050528 0.047072 0.105056
cousin 0.009311 0.006451 0.007765 0.007039 0.027139
half-cousin 0.003337 0.002019 0.002506 0.002095 0.012716
second cousin 0.001971 0.000997 0.001423 0.001145 0.008580
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070495.t003
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decision procedures, distinguishability of first-degree and distant
genetic relatives may be limited (Figure 1). This is especially
troubling when contemplating the possibility that familial searches
may be conducted in the national database, which contains over
ten million profiles. Widening the geographic scope of a search is
likely to result in more of the source’s distant relatives having a
presence in the database.
To be clear, our concerns arise only with respect to inadvertent
erroneous identification of distant relatives as first-degree leads.
Familial searches are ineffective if secondary relatives are
intentionally sought. Indeed, the Myers protocol targets first-
degree relationships only because actively seeking more remote
connections ordinarily returns too many leads to investigate. Yet
familial searches also cannot be configured to assure that only first-
degree relatives of the crime scene sample source are identified as
leads. As our and other research has shown, the tailored approach
of the Myers et al. protocol has the advantage of returning few
spurious leads – if a lead is generated, it is almost certainly a
relative of the crime scene sample source. Our findings, however,
suggest that the closeness of the lead to the source is an open
question. Significantly, our research does not reveal the percentage
of cases in which a lead returned will be a distant relative, as
opposed to a first degree relative. Such an estimation requires a
different set of simulations including complex demographic
estimates.
In our simulations, we set the coancestry coefficient h~:01,
which aligns with the less conservative parameter value suggested
for direct identification [44]. The currently implemented familial
searching methodology in California assumes h~0:0. This
discrepancy contributes to elevated rates of positive identifications
observed between both unrelated individuals and distant Y-
sharing relatives. In addition, our simulation parameter value
h~:01 may be an underestimate for some population samples
[44]. For these cases, we have underestimated the amount of
coincidental relatedness, and thus, estimated power and false
positive rate. This is particularly relevant for some population
samples with higher h including some Native American groups.
In our analysis, we estimate the Y-haplotype frequency upper
95% confidence limit asymptotically, rather than exactly, as
indicated in the Myers et al. method. This estimate may be
sufficient, but has greater error than the exact confidence limit.
For very low Y-haplotype frequencies, the asymptotic estimate
may be lower than the true confidence limit, which would lead to
inflated (anti-conservative) LRY . A study of the affect of different
confidence limit estimates on final outcomes would inform method
choice.
In this study, we have considered only complete genotypes with
no errors or allelic dropout. It is not clear how allelic dropout
would affect familial searching results, but this must be explored
before considering extention to low-template samples.
The probabilities we estimated with our simulations are
necessarily approximate. Autosomal allele and Y-haplotype
frequencies for various population samples are poorly known
because publicly available databases are of limited size and are
unavailable for many population groups. Nevertheless, the groups
for which we have data include African Americans, who have
relatively high genetic diversity at the considered loci, and Native
Americans, who have relatively low diversity, which suggests that
our results are applicable to other populations for which data are
unavailable.
A difference between our analysis and the implemented Myers et
al. method is the one or two-stage design. In the Myers et al.
method, first an analysis is performed using only autosomal data
and the top 168 matches are genotyped for Y-haplotype and the
cumulative statistic X is computed only for these samples [30]. In
our analysis we simply computed the cumulative X for all samples
considered. An additional study of positive identification of distant
relatives using the two-stage method in the context of a realistic
database would provide more realistic rate estimates, however this
sort of analysis is hindered by lack of access to forensic databases
[53]. Such a study is unlikely to show substantially different results
than those presented here since the pairs of individuals we
positively identify as first degree relatives are likely to appear
related and rank above the 168 person threshold.
We also note that in this analysis we only consider the familial
searching method of Myers et al.. To our knowledge, at the writing
of this manuscript, the Myers et al. method is the only explicit
protocol available and the current standard in the field [54,55].
Although the absolute rates of identification will change according
to the method used, when considering LR-based approaches,
which have been shown to be more effective than allele-sharing
methods [56], the trends we observed across population samples
and close and distant relatives will hold.
Implications of spurious identification of distant relatives
Our findings confirm that familial searches carried out
according to the Myers protocol do a good job of locating a
relative if one is in the database. They also affirm that a search is
unlikely to return a false lead – in other words, a match that
appeared to be related to the crime scene source, but in fact was
not. However, we have shown that if there is a more distant
relative in the database, that person may have up to a 42% chance
of being returned as a lead and erroneously labeled as a first
degree relative of the crime scene source (Table 4).
The possibility that the lead is a more remote relative of the
source might not be a concern if investigators could easily
Table 4. Sibling test identification rates for different Y-sharing relatives and population samples.
Vietnamese African European Latino Native
American American American American American
sibling 0.891566 0.819365 0.793025 0.798273 0.925786
parent-offspring 0.907037 0.813399 0.767383 0.777360 0.942995
half-sib 0.303888 0.163525 0.138446 0.140161 0.423558
cousin 0.099529 0.033460 0.028376 0.027985 0.181687
half-cousin 0.044457 0.010445 0.009258 0.008978 0.100643
second cousin 0.027139 0.004934 0.004582 0.004332 0.070761
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070495.t004
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ascertain what kind of lead they had been given. But the Myers
protocol can do no more than alert investigators that the source
may be a relative of the individual in the database; it does not tell
investigators which relative or the closeness or kind of relation. In
any case, once a search returns a lead, law enforcement must
undertake further investigation to locate the actual source. It is the
scope and impact of the follow-up investigation that, in light of our
results, may be troubling.
Before our research identified the possibility that a familial
search might identify distant relatives and erroneously label them
as first degree relatives of the source, it may be that law
enforcement simply assumed that all leads were to a first degree
relative, because that is what the search is structured to find.
Accordingly, if further investigation did not identify a source from
among the lead’s first degree relatives, then officers likely assumed
that the problem was the lead, rather than the depth of their
investigation. In light of our results, however, law enforcement
may now recognize that a lead that fails to reveal a source among
first degree relatives may still be a good lead, it is only that the
investigation must extend to more remote branches of the family
tree.
To illustrate, suppose that law enforcement conducts a familial
search to find a burglar. Following the Myers protocol, the search
returns a lead to the profile of K, a known offender in the
database. Conventional wisdom holds that the burglar is likely a
brother or the father of K, and so law enforcement officers initiate
their investigation accordingly. They ascertain the identify of K’s
father and any brothers, and check their ages and criminal
records. They determine whether the father or brothers were in
the area of the burglary at the time it occurred, used cell phones or
credit cards around that area, or otherwise engaged in suspicious
behavior. Ultimately, they might surreptitiously attempt to obtain
DNA samples for testing from members of K’s immediate family –
say by posing as restaurant personnel or collecting up a half-eaten
lunch. In some number of cases, one of those immediate family
members will match, and the burglar will be found.
But if no match is made, then investigators aware of our
research may conclude three things: that the familial search was
almost certainly effective, that the probability that the lead was a
bad lead is low, and that leads that do not initially pan out are
likely to have faltered only because the source is a more distant
relative than investigators presumed. In other words, the source is
not a brother or father, but instead is a cousin, second cousin,
uncle, half-sibling, or even half-cousin. At that point the officers
have two choices. They may limit themselves to the follow-up they
have already conducted with the first degree relatives and simply
stop their investigation or, more likely, they may simply widen the
scope of their investigation, and start pursuing all second-degree
relatives of the lead.
Our research thus suggests two unanticipated likely outcomes of
familial search policies. First, investigations may wrongly target the
immediate families of known offenders, because officers mistakenly
believe that their lead is a first-degree relative. Second, investiga-
tions may ultimately probe far more deeply than initially
imagined, because once officers are convinced that the source
cannot be found among first degree relatives, they will widen their
net of investigation to include more distant relations. Both of these
consequences exacerbate the numerous ethical problems present-
ed by familial searching.
First, familial searches will affect a greater number of persons.
There is no way for investigators to know from the start that a lead
is a distant, rather than immediate, relative of the source. Thus
suspicion may no longer be restricted to a father and small number
of siblings – one of whom is likely to be the crime scene sample
source – but instead will fall upon innocent immediate family
members and a much larger number of second-degree relatives.
The greater the number of persons involved, and the less likely
that one of them is in fact the perpetrator, the more such
investigations may begin to feel like a fishing expedition rather
than a reasonable search. This is particularly true given that any
investigated family member is, by design, a member of the family
whose DNA is not already in the database as a result of
wrongdoing.
Second, follow-up investigations may prove more intrusive and
yet less effective. Identification of more distant relatives requires
more complicated investigation than does determining a lead’s
immediate family members. For instance, the known offender will
likely have provided information about immediate relatives in the
course of the criminal case that is readily available, such as in a
bail report, corrections dossier, or probation file. But such sources
are much less likely to contain information about secondary
relatives, and thus simply composing the list of potential suspects
could require more aggressive investigation. Moreover, the
difficulty in accurately mapping more distant familial relations
might lower the already low success rate of familial searches.
Although a lead may in fact be a relative, it may simply be too
difficult to locate the actual source if that person is a half-cousin or
other distant relation.
Third, widening the pool intensifies the threat that familial
searching poses to our understandings of families as construc-
tions of social, not biological, realities. A person may have
hundreds of ‘‘cousins’’ but only a handful of biological cousins.
Investigators may either ignore the difference and unnecessarily
investigate those non-biological relations, or else engage in
potentially intrusive questioning or activity (such as DNA
sampling) to differentiate between proffered and actual rela-
tions. Probing secondary biological relationships might also
dredge up painful family experiences of death, unknown
biological ties, or previous partners. And, to the extent that
some advocates of familial searching have justified the practice
on grounds akin to ‘‘crime runs in families,’’ such arguments
may be less defensible when more remote connections are
involved.
Finally, to the extent that our findings suggest that familial
searches may in fact necessitate investigating a greater number of
people with a greater degree of intrusiveness, that consequence is
particularly troubling in that it will be specially visited on certain
racial groups. It has been well documented that familial searching
is apt to disproportionately affect African American families, due
to the greater representation of those groups in DNA databases
and the high rate of intra-racial procreation. Limiting investiga-
tions to the immediate family members of known offenders at least
minimizes the intrusion on innocent relatives within those racial
groups. But if more distant relations are included, the web of
potential ‘‘genetic suspects’’ becomes still broader, and may
effectively encompass entire communities. It takes only one
member of a large and varied family tree to render every father,
brother, half-brother, cousin, half-cousin, uncle, nephew and so on
vulnerable to scrutiny and surreptitious sampling by law enforce-
ment officers.
Of course, it is always possible to limit, for practical or ethical
reasons, the range of permissible follow-up investigation to first
degree relatives in familial search cases as a matter of policy. Such
an approach might be sensible from a practical perspective in light
of the difficulty in identifying and investigating more remote
relatives, and the heightened ethical concerns. It would also ensure
that any spurious leads – of which, granted, there are expected to
be few – would not first generate highly invasive and costly
Distant Relatives in Familial Searching
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investigations. Whatever the case, our research suggests that as
states and localities debate the virtues of familial searching and
craft policies to govern law enforcement, it would be wise to
consider terms delimiting the scope of potential follow-up
investigation with regard to degree of relatedness.
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